The Israelis have lived with danger and threat for their entire existence.
Depending on how far back their history is traced, talk of their existence could imply over half a century or even thousands of years.
During that time it has been under attack almost constantly by nation states and stateless actors.
Israel contends with these issues largely alone and has developed an infamously thick skin against international criticism.
The steps Jerusalem takes in protecting its people are sometimes harsh and careless, but they are always swift and their retribution is complete.
This last year has seen a relatively peaceful period for Israel. During the so-called “Arab Spring” many of its traditional enemies such as Egypt were distracted by their own domestic politics.
Because of the relative tranquillity Jerusalem has its eyes on the larger region. Israel rarely has the opportunity to assess the region’s political trajectory without having to divide their attention at home. The political movements in Iran and their on-going nuclear programme appear something of an obsession for Jerusalem.
It is peace with Egypt, the most important of its neighbours, that is critical for the survival of the Jewish state. Since President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in what can most closely be described as a military coup, the Arab country has fluctuated between chaos and a tentative, democratic stability.
The military regime, of which Mubarak was host, managed skilfully to retain much of its power but the democratically elected Egyptian government is increasing its grip.
President Mohammad Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral candidate and eventual winner of Cairo’s June elections, promised to honour treaties with Israel before he took office.
Both countries relied on a binding non-aggression pact for peace, although Egypt would benefit more today from such a treaty than would a more militarily robust and technologically advanced Israel.
However, the turmoil in Egypt through 2011 and 2012 did worry Jerusalem. Mr Mubarak was a known entity, was predictable and Israel knew what strings it needed to pull in any discussions.
The Muslim Brotherhood of 2011 offered less room for forecasting. It had a reputation for militancy and radical Islamism, a volatile mix that has plagued the region for many years.
Its political wing was untested and Jerusalem became increasingly nervous as it was clear this group would win the Egyptian elections.
Mr Morsi initially allayed Israeli fears of a destabilisation in Egypt-Israel affairs because he did not inherit clear supreme control from the military regime. The military skilfully diluted the new government’s power and a not-yet-completed fresh will likely continue this trend.
But in a remarkable power play August 14, Mr Morsi ordered five top members of the military into retirement while announcing the abrogation of procedures by the military to restrict his power.
The military has not opposed the new president's moves, which were in part a response to the its failures ove the recent killings of 16 Egyptian soldiers during terrorist violence in the Sinai Peninsula on August 5.
Mr Morsi's actions probably surpass his legal authority, but the Egyptian Supreme Council of Armed Forces likely agreed with the dismissals anyway.
As the MB moves to gain greater political control in Cairo, he is turning his sights on Israel and the Sinai, suggesting he will revise the 1978 Camp David accords.
As a strategic buffer offering valuable time and early warning for each nation, the Sinai Peninsula has been effectively off limits for decades. Reviewing the accords would certainly help Mr Morsi and the MB at home, but might strain the Egypt-Israel relationship.
If Egypt is going to deal with increasing militancy in Sinai it will need to base larger concentrations of troops there. It is now unable to do so under the present Camp David accords and Morsi needs to discuss treaty changes with Israel if the peninsula is to be cleaned up.
Also, Egypt badly needs to kick-start its economy after the disruptive demonstrations. It has dropped almost $22 billion of foreign reserves since before 2010, regaining only a fraction of this through donations by some Gulf states.
Cairo has depended on US financial aid to survive (a central part of the accords) and Mr Morsi’s plan to revise the treaty is probably aimed at enticing Washington to restart the flow of suspended aid.
The MB is trying to assert more control over Cairo by dealing with Israel and the United States directly and sidestepping the military council. But the president deeper reasons. The Egyptian populace have felt the treaty was against their interests from the start.
As sensitive as the issue of nullifying the military’s tight grip on power might be, the inequality Egyptians feel compared with Israel stings even more. Regaining sovereign control over the Sinai would be a huge boost for Mr Morsi’s ratings and Egyptian morale.
It is unlikely the MB want to cancel the treaty as doing so would raise tensions with Israel unnecessarily in a sensitive Egyptian transition period. The two countries face an uncertain decade ahead where many more geopolitical fractures will occur.
Extra Egyptian troops in Sinai may not immediately threaten Israel, although it could again set a dangerous precedence of free military movement on the peninsula.
The Muslim Brotherhood will use the Sinai as a three-way lever. Drawing Washington back into aid donations, challenging the military’s rule on foreign affairs and creating an affirmative climate for the MB among its constituency.
It could be that the democratically elected government in Cairo is dangerously awakening sleeping Sinai dogs, but their political manoeuvring is untested and could well prove competent and ultimately benign.
Regardless, Israel, jumpy as it might be, will watch President Morsi’s movements closely – even if he is on a short leash.
Nathan Smith has studied international relations and conflict at Massey University. He blogs at INTEL and Analysis
Nathan Smith
Fri, 17 Aug 2012