Because the outcome of intervention in Syria is uncertain, the international community will continue to covertly assist the opposition but fall short of contributing conventional forces to exact a regime change.
The international community continues to call for military intervention in the Syrian conflict by Western nations – and in particular the United States – as they did in Libya.
Because the outcome of intervention is uncertain, the international community will continue to covertly assist the opposition but fall short of contributing conventional forces to exact a regime change.
One of the perceived positive consequences of intervention is to forcibly stop Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime from conducting further violence towards the Syrian rebels.
Once Mr Assad is gone the opposition could then nominate a replacement leader, hopefully through a democratic process. Future atrocities will be avoided and recent victims of atrocities will find retribution when he is dragged before the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The parallel being made between Libya and Syria is not entirely accurate. Libya at the time of Nato intervention was a country split from its east to west. By the time Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi began to use aircraft to bomb rebel positions, triggering the Nato-led war, the rebellion had total control of a clear territory.
This made it simple for the Nato planes to find enemy targets. A split in the Libyan military also significantly assisted the rebels.
As for the no-fly zone, Libyan air defence systems had been critically weak for years and were unlikely to be at full operating capacity. Finding and destroying these batteries was not difficult as the surface-to-air missile system was neither overlapping or was redundant, giving anything but full protection for Libyan positions. The fixed sites were also well known to Nato intelligence.
Finally, apart from inserting western special forces into Libya to co-ordinate rebel forces and direct airstrikes, no Nato ground troops were committed to the war. The task of securing Libya was left to the rebel factions as Nato departed. There was no occupation force.
Syria, on the other hand, is not experiencing an insurrection where clear rebel positions are delineated. The rebellion is scattered throughout Syria and even in cities such as Homs, where the uprising has been very active, there are suburbs still housing supporters of Assad’s regime.
While Libya at the time of Western intervention had competing rebel factions, they were able to coalesce into a unified, legitimately recognisable group that facilitated Western political support.
Syrian opposition is not unified, and their goals are not identical. The uprising cannot lend a singular international voice to the movement when it addresses international councils.
Syrian air defence is easily one of the most robust, if slightly ageing, systems in the Middle East and is accompanied by a strong early-warning network. Enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria would require a concerted effort by an extremely competent air force.
The United States is the only Nato member with such an anti-air defence capability. But breaking the network of Syrian SAM sites would take weeks, and maybe months, cost millions of dollars in munitions and lost aircraft, and probably cut short the lives of many American pilots.
The political will of the US voting public is simply not conducive to such a campaign. An election is planned for November this year and President Barack Obama’s second-term election prospects would be severely damaged if an intervention in Syria became unexpectedly complicated.
This is not to mention the lack of political will and inadequate military capabilities of other Nato countries. The advocates of military intervention suggest Nato would shoulder the burden, but there is deep division among European countries over what should be done and when.
Controlling Syria would take more than just enforcing a Libya-style no-fly zone. A country so divided and so large is predicted to require the insertion of ground troops to set up safe zones for the rebels. Those troops would need protection, implying the inclusion of armour and close air support.
To carry out this function, tanks and aircraft would need access to military bases in neighbouring countries. Politically, they would need to agree to house thousands of foreign troops and open logistical routes, a difficult sell for any government, let alone one in the Middle East.
The situation inside Syria itself is not clear. The opposition seems to have a fair amount of local support, but just how much covert foreign assistance they are getting from foreign intelligence services is unknown.
In a country of 22 million people, the uprising has included only a small fraction of the population so far. This indicates the Assad regime still has a significant support base.
That would make sense. A regime like Assad’s does not live in a vacuum. Just like Gadhafi in Libya, the government has learned how to play the various tribes and cultural factions. The Western narrative of an entire Syria gripped by hatred for its despotic leader fails to acknowledge the relatively small number of opposition participants.
Assad is a representative of the minority Alawite sect, which explains why he is receiving such a depth of support. Removing him will endanger them.
The Alawite branch of the Shi’a Islamic faith has historically been persecuted in both Lebanon and Syria. While there certainly is discontent towards Assad from the Syrian Sunni, the minority Alawite and Shia Muslims owe their relative safety to Assad’s rule.
It also explains why the military and security apparatus has not turned on him yet. Almost all of the top positions, often down to individual officer levels, are filled by Alawites deeply loyal to the regime.
In the attempt to limit the humanitarian crisis in Syria militarily, the international community could be ushering in an equally great threat of immediate political chaos while awakening the deep historical grievances of Syria’s minorities.
Intervention may also have the unintended consequence of a temporary lapse in security over the country's heavy weapons. Remember that when the Libyan guards deserted their packed weapons depots the Tuareg mercenaries who fought for Gadhafi seized those arms.
They promptly took them home to Mali, using them to stage an uprising of their own. The sub-Saharan country is now divided and the Tuareg-led rebellion controls half the state.
Syria is in much greater danger of weapon proliferation than Libya if the regime fails. Where Syrian arms would end up is anyone’s guess, but militants in the Middle East are likely clamouring to get their hands on them.
Ultimately, there are still some good reasons to intervene in Syria. The humanitarian crisis is morally impossible to ignore and international calls for action will become louder as it intensifies.
However, the unintended consequences of an intervention are potentially so disastrous for Syria and the region that Western nations will remain unwilling to commit to such an extreme action.
Nathan Smith has studied international relations and conflict at Massey University. He blogs at INTEL and Analysis
